Mesa Temática No. 16
AULA 2
PLANNING
Jueves 4
11:00-11:30
Francisco Garrido Peña (UJA), "Juegos de bienes públicos
intergeneracionales y los escaños de las generaciones futuras"
11:30-12:00
Fernando Aguiar (CSIC): "Sexo, vejez y asco moral"
12:00-12:30
Blanca Rodríguez (UCM), "Efectos del consentimiento del paciente en la
descripción intencional y causal de las intervenciones al final de la
vida"
16:00-16:30
Pedro Francés (UGR), "Velo de ignorancia, acuerdo y sentido de la
justicia: un diseño experimental"
16:30-17:00
Francisco Garrido Peña (UJA), "Simulación y pagos en el juego del ultimátum".
ÉTICA EXPERIMENTAL: MÉTODOS, TEORÍAS Y APLICACIONES
Participantes
Pilar Aguilar Barriga
Gemma Sáez Díaz
Blanca Rodríguez López
David Rodríguez Arias
Aníbal Monasterio Astobiza
Fernando Aguiar
Ivar Rodríguez Hannikainen
Pedro Francés
Francisco Garrido Peña
ABSTRACTS
Juegos de bienes públicos intergeneracionales y los escaños de las generaciones futuras.
Francisco Garrido Peña.
Universidad de Jaén.
Resumen.
La tendencia evolutiva individual de la especie humana a bajas tasas de descuento intertemporal plantea una grave objeción para la interiorización en las instituciones púbicas de programas de decisión que incorporen los derechos e intereses de las generaciones futuras. En esta comunicación se informa de los primeros resultados de la aplicación de un modelo de juegos de bienes públicos intergeneracionales
SEXO, ASCO Y VEJEZ ¿AFECTA LA EDAD A NUESTROS JUICIOS SOBRE REPUGNANCIA MORAL?
Fernando Aguiar (IFS-CSIC)
Pilar Aguilar (Universidad Loyola Andalucía)
Gemma Sáez Díaz (Universidad Loyola Andalucía)
En esta investigación sobre vejez y asco moral, que procede de un experimento piloto previo, queremos comprobar la solidez de algunos de los resultados obtenidos en aquel experimento. Nuestros objetivos son, por lo tanto, los siguientes:
Las personas mayores (su aspecto), a diferencia de los jóvenes, ¿nos causan algún tipo de sensación relacionada con el asco? Si es así, ¿deriva esa sensación de asco hacia juicios morales más severos contra ellos, esto es, deriva el asco físico hacia el asco moral cuando se trata de juzgar el comportamiento moral de personas mayores? Si, como ocurría en algunos de los casos estudiados en el experimento piloto, la gente puede ser más condescendiente con las personas mayores a la hora de juzgarlas moralmente, habría que cuestionar el supuesto vínculo entre asco físico y asco moral. ¿Pero a qué se debería esa diferencia de juicio, esa condescendencia, centrada en la edad?¿Hay diferencias de género? ¿Producen los hombres mayores más asco que las mujeres u ocurre más bien lo contrario? Y si es así, ¿son más severos los juicios morales con los hombres que con las mujeres o al revés?
Effects of patient consent on the intentional and causal description of end-of-life interventions
by
Blanca Rodriguez Lopez (Universidad Complutense de Madrid), David Rodriguez-Arias (Universidad de Granada), Ivar Rodríguez Hannikainen (Basque Government posdoctoral researcher, UPV/EHU) y Anibal Monasterio Astobiza (PUC, Rio de Janeiro).
Abstract.
Many bioethicists, including deontologists, have argued that moral judgments of human behaviours depend on the very nature of those behaviours. For instance, “killing” or “torturing” are intrinsically wrong, and could never be morally justified. This is a controversial assumption for consequentialists, who believe that behaviours cannot be morally judged independently of their consequences. Another common --but much less discussed-- assumption in bioethics debates, refers to the way the temporal sequence of the moral judgment is conceived. It is commonly assumed that we first describe behaviours in causal and intentional terms, and derivatively we make moral evaluations of them. This pattern is particularly explicit in end-of-life debates, where the distinction between “killing” and “letting die” is commonly invoked to justify why “killing” is, all things being equal, more problematic than “letting die”; or why “killing” should remain legally prohibited while “letting die” should not. Recent years have seen a flood of theoretical and empirical research on the act/omission distinction. People tend to judge “acts” as morally more relevant than “omissions”. Many reports in the academic literature demonstrate that harmful acts are judged more severely than corresponding omissions. Yet, some empirical studies (Cushman, Knobe and Sinnot-Armstrong 2008) show, however, that moral judgments of others’ behavior also shapes corresponding causal and intentional descriptions.
In the present study, we investigate whether, in the realm of end of life decisions, causal and intentional behavioral descriptions are influenced by the moral valence of end-of-life interventions. Specifically, we manipulate patients’ will—whether the patient wishes to die or not—and probe lay participants’ assessments of the physician’s causal role in bringing about the patient’s death.
We hypothesized that individuals conduct a moral assessment regarding the physicians’ behavior, which then impacts descriptions of the physician’s causal role on the patient’s death.As predicted, patient consent exerted a large influence on causal and intentional analyses across four distinct end-of-life scenarios. For instance, when asked about the “cause of the patient’s death”, participants ascribed a primary role to illness in the presence of consent, but to the doctor’s actions in its absence. When asked explicitly about their attitudes towards euthanasia, participants reported overwhelming approval—suggesting that moral opposition to medically-assisted death is not necessary for effects of consent on causal analysis to emerge. In ongoing work, we are investigating whether these effects are mitigated or aggravated by medical expertise.
Keywords: bioethics, end-of-life decisions, acts/omissions distinction, moral assessments, experimental philosophy
“Veil of ignorance, agreement and the sense of justice: An experimental design”
Authores: Giacomo DegliAntoni, Marco Faillo, Pedro Francés-Gómez, Laura Marcon, Lorenzo Sacconi.
Presenta: Pedro Francés-Gómez (University of Granada, Spain – Fulbright Visiting Fellow Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University)
Proyecto de investigación BENEB III (Business Ethics: Normativity and Economic Behavior III: a New Social Contract) FFI2017-87953R
Título y resumen en inglés. La presentación será en inglés o español.
The talk presents an on-going research project based on a series of experiments designed to test the following: first, whether people behind a veil of ignorance choose a liberal-egalitarian principle of fair distribution for a real situation in which they are going to participate by working and generating a common output; second, whether and to what extent do people actually distribute their commonly produced output according to the agreed principle, in absence of any coercive power, reciprocity/reputation effect, or external incentives to comply.
The underlying rationale for our questions is the idea that experimental data may help underpin normative theories of justice (Binmore 1993) –in particular we are interested in social-contract theories that defend liberal-egalitarian principles for institutional justice. As is well-known, social-contract theories, in particular the Rawlsian version, assume that ideally rational agents situated behind a veil of ignorance would agree on a liberal-egalitarian principle of distributive justice; they assume further that rational people can commit themselves to act in a fair manner out of a “sense of justice”. These theories are much criticized for their idealizing assumptions: if these assumptions are too removed from what is possible for ordinary people, normative theories may well lack applicability. Our objective is to contribute to the realism of social-contract theories by exploring to what extent some of these idealizing assumptions are reflected in actual behavior.
Some preliminary results show that subjects:Do indeed tend to agree on a liberal-egalitarian principle for distribution of common output when situated behind a veil of ignorance (knowing which kind of task they are going to perform, but ignoring a crucial element in their endowment: in our case, how many minutes they will have to work -in this case more minutes imply almost certainly more production).
They comply with the agreed-upon principle much more than expected –much more than predicted by standard economic models.
The level of compliance depends to some extent on how agreement behind the veil of ignorance is reached: if they can talk to each other, even if the chat is anonymous, compliance level rises.They are influenced by actual bargaining and agreement among them (however it is reached) but not much by simply simulating the reasoning of the social contract.
Sourcehood versus Alternate Possibilities: The Problem of Free Will Throughout 21 Countries
Ivar Hannikainen
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Some philosophers hold that agents in a deterministic universe lack free will and are not responsible for their actions either because they lack alternate possibilities or because they are not the ultimate source of their actions. Do laypeople take either of these implications of determinism to preclude free will and moral responsibility? Building on previous work, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,280) spanning twenty-one countries and sixteen languages to answer this question. Overall, for Western participants, failing to be the ultimate source of an action undermines free will, control, blameworthiness, and deserved punishment to a much greater extent than the absence of alternate possibilities. By contrast, Asian participants did not distinguish lack of sourcehood from absence of alternate possibilities. Within cultures, incompatibilist attitudes toward sourcehood, but not alternate possibilities, were also associated with cognitive reflection. We discuss these findings in light of past evidence about cultural differences in dispositional versus situational causal explanations of behavior. Finally, cognitive reflection appeared to account for the observed relationship between extraversion and ascription of free will and responsibility that has been reported in previous studies.
Simulación y pagos en el juego del ultimátum.
Francisco Garrido Peña
Universidad de Jaén.
El objetivo de esta comunicación es comparar los resultados obtenidos en diversos ensayos simulados (sin dinero) del juego del ultimátum con grupos de alumnas y alumnos (universidad de Jaén, universidad de Granada y UNIA) a lo largo de los últimos cuatro años y los resultados que indica la literatura científica sobre el juego del ultimátum utilizando pagos dinerarios. A partir de esa comparativa, propongo una serie un hipótesis sobre la naturaleza de la motivación dominante en las conductas de los jugadores tanto en los juegos simulados como en los juegos reales con pago en dinero.
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